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Abstract

Nikita Khrushchev’s time in power from 1953-1964 has often been thought of as a period of
“thaw” in the Soviet Union, as he allowed a certain degree of freedom of expression for artists
and writers. However, this view of the Khrushchev “thaw” ignores the blatant human rights
violations enacted by the Soviet Union during this time, specifically in its treatment of
evangelicals and other dissidents. This work examines Khrushchev’s treatment of evangelicals
and other dissidents with the goal of refining modern perceptions on Khrushchev’s time in
office. The timelines and methods of both the anti-religious campaign of 1959-1964 and the antidissent campaigns of 1953-1964 are examined and analyzed. The work concludes with a
comparison of Khrushchev’s treatment of evangelicals with his treatment of other dissidents,
concluding that the idea of a “thaw” presents an oversimplified understanding of this period, as it
does not account for the difference in Khrushchev’s treatment of these two groups.
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Voices of Courage

A Comparison of the Treatment of Evangelicals and Dissidents under Khrushchev
Introduction
Dominic Erdozain describes the Russian Revolution as “a breathtaking experiment in the
reordering of a civilization.”1 As lofty as this description is, the truth has often been much
harsher. The costs of this “experiment” have been high, and the lessons learned from it should
not be easily forgotten. Even those periods of apparent leniency, such as the Khrushchev “thaw”
from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s, display interesting contradictions that challenge any
optimistic views of the Soviet Union. Nikita Khrushchev’s treatment of evangelicals and other
dissidents expresses the paradoxical lie of the Khrushchev “thaw,” highlighting the lack of
freedom inherent in the Soviet system.
Background
The history of the Soviet Union began in 1917 with the overthrow of the Romanov
dynasty and the initiation of a socialist form of government. These events were sparked by a
series of strikes and demonstrations beginning on February 23, 1917; over the next several days,
the demonstrations grew in size and influence, prompting even tsarist soldiers to join the
movement.2 With the abdication of Nicholas II on March 2, and his brother’s subsequent refusal
to accept the throne, the Romanov dynasty was gone and a new era had begun.3 American
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newspapers of the time heralded the revolution with joyful shouts. The Baltimore Sun cited the
event as a “big triumph of democracy” and a “dramatic overthrow of autocracy.”4 However, this
hopeful spirit was not to last, as the likes of Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin exercised their
power on the Russian people. A New York Times article from 1989 quotes the calculations of
Soviet dissident Roy Medvedev that over 20 million people died under Stalin alone.5
By the time of Nikita Khrushchev, the people of the Soviet Union had learned from
experience how terrible autocracy could really be. Coming out from the leadership of Joseph
Stalin in 1953, “the country was exhausted by war, terror, and poverty.”6 Looking back,
Khrushchev recognized the devastation of this period, stating that the Russian people under
Stalin “were exhausted by the war, starving for food and in desperate need of clothes.”7 In
addition to dealing with material shortages, the new leaders of the Soviet Union struggled with
interpreting the purges and terror of the past several decades in a way which acknowledged the
horrors caused by Stalin without implicating themselves in those horrors.8
Khrushchev’s Rise to Power
Amid these troubles, Khrushchev slowly emerged as leader of the Soviet Union. His rise
to power was, in many ways, unexpected. The Manchester Guardian, reporting on March 5,

Isaac Don Levine, “Big Triumph of Democracy: Revolution in Russia, A Dramatic Overthrow of
Autocracy,” The Baltimore Sun, March 16, 1917, 1.
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Little, Brown and Company, 1974), 12.
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1953, cited the “unanimous conclusion … that the succession would pass to one of three men …
Georgi Malenkov, Lavrenti Beria, or Mr. Molotov.”9 These expectations began to deteriorate,
however, over the next several months. By mid-March 1953, Khrushchev was the “senior
member of the Central Committee Secretariat.”10 By July, Khrushchev had conspired with
Malenkov to have Beria arrested, followed by his subsequent execution in December.11 Over the
next year and a half, Khrushchev slowly worked to increase his own power while reducing
Malenkov’s influence, eventually leading to Malenkov’s resignation of the premiership on
February 8, 1955.12 Khrushchev now stood as the leader of the Soviet Union.
General Overview of Khrushchev’s Time in Office
Khrushchev’s era proved to be both a continuation and a deviation from the methods and
beliefs of previous leaders. One of his most obvious deviations from the past was the “secret
speech” of 1956, a four-hour long denunciation of Stalin, followed by subsequent deStalinization efforts. Similarly, Khrushchev supported economic beliefs which, to some, might
sound capitalistic. For example, in his memoirs Khrushchev argued for the necessity of “material
incentives” for collective farmers, stating that the idea that “our people should be motivated not
by money but by ideological considerations” is “nonsense.”13 He continued by criticizing Stalin

Alistair Cooke, “Washington Wonders About Stalin’s Successor: Fears That Malenkov May Follow with
More Aggressive Policy,” The Manchester Guardian, March 5, 1953, 5.
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for refusing “to acknowledge that fact.”14 At the same time, Khrushchev continued to reflect the
ideology which had given birth to the Soviet Union. Peter Kenez argues that Khrushchev
remained a staunch believer in “the superiority of the Soviet political and economic system.”15
Khrushchev’s internal reforms, although not always successful, could be ambitious and
wide sweeping. In the agricultural sector, he raised the prices of products produced on collective
farms and lowered the taxes “that the peasants paid on profits from the sale of produce and
domestic animals,” providing greater incentives for peasants to develop their land.16 He also
developed the virgin land program, an ambitious project to cultivate previously uncultivated
parts of the Soviet Union, especially in central Asia and Siberia.17 In the industrial sector, he
worked to reorganize the economy, including decentralizing industry by placing it under the
oversight of 100 local economic councils rather than under economic ministries.18 In the
educational sector, he removed tuition requirements at institutions of higher education and took
other steps to make education more accessible to the disadvantaged.19
Despite these reforms, Khrushchev remained a proponent of the Soviet system, a system
notorious for the lack of individual liberty given to its citizens. This system could be especially
hateful towards those who disagreed with it, including evangelical Christians and other
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dissidents. Although Khrushchev’s era is often viewed as a time of “thaw” following the harsh
Stalinist years, his time in office was far from peaceful for those with the courage to stand up for
their views.
General History of Evangelicals in Russia
The evangelical presence in Russia reaches back to the 1860s, when multiple religious
movements began to emerge and converge with each other. Heather Coleman points out that the
Baptist movement arose separately in Transcaucasia, Ukraine, and St. Petersburg.20 Baptized in
1867, Nikitva Voronin became the first official Russian Baptist, triggering the movement.21 At
the same time, the shtundist movement arose among Russian peasants in Ukraine, heavily
influenced by German colonists in the area and their “revivalistic religious meetings.”22 A few
years later brought the arrival of another evangelical movement in St. Petersburg through the
work of an English nobleman named Lord Radstock.23 Colonel Pashkov, for whom the
movement gained the name of Pashkovism, assumed leadership and began to engage in a variety
of philanthropic and evangelistic endeavors, including the printing of religious literature.24
It was at the initiation of Colonel Pashkov that the Russian evangelical movement of
today began to take shape. In 1884 he called a meeting of various evangelical groups, including
“shtundists, Pashkovites, Baptists (German and Russian), Mennonite Brethren, and an

20
Heather Coleman, Russian Baptists and Spiritual Revolution, 1905-1929 (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2005), 14.
21

Walter Sawatsky, Soviet Evangelicals Since World War II (Scottsdale, PA: Herald Press, 1981), 33.
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evangelical stream of Molokanism.”25 Although this meeting ended in a police raid, soon
afterwards the southern Baptists initiated their own meeting; this not only helped solidify
doctrine but is also considered “the founding gathering of the Union of Russian Baptists.”26 This
was followed in 1905 by a decree issued by Nicholas II regarding religious toleration.27
However, revolution was in the air and by 1920, evangelicals were under a new government.
Treatment of Evangelicals under Other Regimes
Just as American newspapers hailed the Russian Revolution as a triumph for democracy,
some Russian evangelicals looked optimistically at the changes around them. Heather Coleman
describes the excitement of Russian evangelicals and their hope that the revolution would work
to build Christ’s kingdom and provide a release from the government pressure they had
previously been facing.28 And they may have had support for their hopeful predictions. Before
the revolution, “interest in the political implications of religious dissidence was long-standing
and widespread among liberals, populists, and Marxists.”29 For example, the Second Congress of
the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party in 1903 recognized the “sectarian movement” as
“one of the democratic currents directed against the existing order of things” and encouraged
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“Party members to work among sectarians for the purpose of attracting them to SocialDemocracy.”30
Despite this ‘promising’ beginning, the new Soviet government vacillated in its response
to the evangelicals. From 1921-1928, the government allowed sectarians a certain degree of
freedom, hoping that this would weaken the Orthodox Church.31 Anti-religious propaganda
during this period generally focused on Orthodox believers, while portraying Protestants as
“hardworking and loyal,” “contributing objectively to the building socialism” despite their
ideological misunderstandings.32 Robert Conquest even claims that the January 4, 1919 decree,
accommodating religious conscientious objectors, “was enacted largely for their [the
Evangelicals’] benefit.”33
However, the end of the decade brought decisive change. In the years leading up to 1929,
the Soviet government slowly began chipping away at the freedoms allowed to believers, largely
focusing on the Orthodox Church.34 The period brought a new emphasis on anti-religious
propaganda and re-education, as well as clarification about whether believers could be accepted
into the Communist Party.35 In 1924 a “state publishing house for anti-religious literature was

30

Robert Conquest, ed., Religion in the U.S.S.R., The Contemporary Soviet Union Series: Institutions and
Policies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 99.
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32
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established,” while the following year saw an increase in persecution of other Christian
denominations besides Orthodoxy.36 However, the climax came on April 8, 1929, with the
release of the Law on Religious Associations.37 Remaining in effect until 1990, the law severely
restricted the ability of believers to evangelize and engage in society.38
The following years only increased the pressure felt by Evangelicals. In June 1929, the
Central Committee authorized the League of Militant Atheists to “launch a campaign to destroy
religion.”39 During the Stalinist purges of the 1930s, evangelicals were often labeled as kulaks
and sentenced accordingly.40 Philip Walters briefly summarizes the effect of this persecution:
“Taking the decade as a whole … there can be no doubt that individual believers and religious
institutions of all kinds suffered more radically than at any other time in the Soviet period. By the
end of the decade, visible religious life had been virtually destroyed.”41 These harsh tactics were
temporarily reversed by a New Religious Policy in 1939.42 Influenced by the rise of World War
II, this policy relaxed government pressure slightly, giving evangelicals room to breathe.43
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Treatment of Evangelicals under Khrushchev
The Khrushchev era marked the beginning of an anti-religious campaign that would last
until 1964. Khrushchev wanted to prepare the Soviet Union for the transition from socialism to
communism.44 A key part of this transition was the removal of religion.45 Russian churches
began experiencing a slow, but steady, rise in government pressure beginning in the late 1950s.46
This pressure developed into the anti-religious campaign of 1959-1964, during which time
various methods of harassment and pressure were employed against believers, including public
humiliation, pay reduction, refusal of higher education, and even occasionally the removal of
parental rights.47 Walter Sawatsky identifies several phases in the 1959-1964 anti-religious
campaign.48
The first phase, lasting from 1959-1961, focused on “Leninist legality.” In essence, the
government sought to re-establish the ground that had been lost to the evangelicals during World
War II by reverting to the literal letter of previous laws regarding religion in the Soviet Union.49
Measures taken by the government included increased anti-religious propaganda, church
closures, and the arrest of multiple believers.50 An anti-religious poster from 1965 depicts some
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of the propaganda methods used. Entitled “Useless Labor,” the poster depicts several very
religious looking people (a priest, a patriarch, and two monks) failing in their attempts to prop up
a falling church building with huge books entitled “Chemistry,” “Physics,” “History,” and
“Astronomy.”51 In the first half of 1961, the government closed 300 Baptist churches, leading
many believers to worry that this would lead to the closure of all churches within three years.52
Although these fears did not come to pass, they were not overexaggerated. A New York Times
article from December 29, 1961 highlights the desperate straits of Soviet churches, reporting
1,500 church closures among both Orthodox Churches and other groups in 1961.53 Powell states
that during the Khrushchev era, half of “Russian Orthodox, Baptists, Lutherans, and Catholics”
faced church closures.54
The second phase, which Sawatsky titles “Resistance and Toughened Legislation,” lasted
from 1961-1962.55 During this period, a variety of resistance movements arose, including various
samizdats (or self-publications) and the rise of the Initsiativniki, an underground Evangelical
church movement.56 Indeed, these two movements were closely intertwined, as the Initsiativniki

K. Nevler, “Naprasnyĭ trud,” poster, 1965, Keston Digital Archives, https://digitalcollectionsbaylor.quartexcollections.com/Documents/Detail/naprasnyi-trud/1064109.
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made increased use of samizdat to communicate with each other and organize themselves.57 At
the same time, the government enacted increased pressure against religious organizations.
Perhaps one of the clearest pieces of legislation issued during this time was a March 1961
Instruction which “reiterated and expanded on the list of activities prohibited to religious
communities from the 1929 Law on Religious Associations.”58 The Instruction made registration
more difficult for churches, as well as strengthening the position of the two councils of
religion.59 A year later, the RSFR legal code was adapted to include three new articles
specifically focused on religious activity.60
1963 marked the beginning of a third phase. This phase focused on a “differentiated
policy” towards religious groups, with some religious groups, often registered congregations,
allowed more freedom than others, usually nonregistered congregations.61 As mentioned above,
the concept of church registration emerged in 1929 with the Law on Religious Associations.62
Once a congregation reached twenty people, it could apply for registration with the Soviet
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government, allowing its activities a certain degree of legality.63 However, registration also
meant that a “list of all the members was maintained by the local state authorities.”64
Understandably, the government strongly pushed for registration of churches, while
certain churches, also understandably, resisted this pressure. Indeed, Walters suggests that the
differentiated policy of 1963 policy may have been used to place pressure on unregistered
churches to encourage them to “observe the same conditions as those already agreed to by
‘official’ Baptist congregations.”65 This strategy of ‘divide and conquer’ would continue even
past Khrushchev’s time in office, with the official registered churches treated with much greater
leniency than the unregistered churches.66 For example, Anderson points out that “unregistered
communities” often bore “the brunt of the attack on services.”67
Sawatsky describes the fourth phase, taking place in 1964, as a time of reevaluation.
During this period, government tactics focused more increasingly on atheistic education, while at
the same time reversing some of the more aggressive attacks against believers.68 As part of this
new focus, the Institute of Scientific Atheism was established in early 1964 with the goal of
controlling “all the atheistic indoctrinational activities of the institutions of higher education and
the institutions connected with the various Ministries of Culture.”69 Moreover, atheistic
63
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education was not targeted solely at institutions of higher education. For example, an article from
1964 “singled out the need to eradicate the organised teaching of religion to children.”70 The
importance of atheistic education would be emphasized in the upcoming years; so much so, that
Anderson suggests that it was the emphasis on “atheist work” during this period which would
establish the foundation for religious policy in the years following Khrushchev.71
Despite these gross attacks against the rights of believers, historians struggle to find any
major legislation regarding religion during this time. Indeed, Anderson points out that the 19591964 anti-religious campaign is marked by a lack of major religious legislation.72 New religious
policy was “facilitated by decisions at Party Congresses, and put into effect through decrees,
many of which remained secret, and oral instructions, leading to a whole gamut of selective
discriminatory practices known as ‘advministrirovanie’.”73 Many of the decision-making
processes appeared to take place in the shadows, working through various government channels
to accomplish their goal. For example, during the brief 1954 anti-religious campaign, various
entities, including the Ministry of Culture, state publishing houses, and education ministries,
were encouraged to increase the amount of atheistic education and anti-religious propaganda.74
State pressure had a significant impact on the daily lives of believers, affecting almost
every area of their lives, from church services to birthday parties. Sometimes believers were
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merely restricted from certain opportunities. For example, a believer shared in an interview how
she was blocked from entering the university by an unfair grade on her high school graduation
certificate.75 At other times, Soviet pressure forced evangelicals to compromise their beliefs,
such as with the doctrine of pacifism. In the 1920s, the Evangelical Christians and Baptists
“passed resolutions, under official pressure, in favor of military service,” despite the fact that
pacifism was deeply intertwined with the beliefs of many Russian evangelicals.76
However, government persecution could also encourage believers to adapt to their
surroundings in creative ways. For example, the greetings exchanged during the service were not
only a way for believers to stay connected with those from other cities but also a clever way for
traveling preachers to navigate laws restricting them from preaching outside of their churches.77
A traveling preacher might give a greeting from Paul, continuing with a 20-minute sermon about
what the Apostle Paul had said in his epistles. Similarly, evangelicals navigated restrictions on
religious education and evangelism by integrating their faith into everyday activities. For
example, a birthday party might function as a Sunday School, while marriages and funerals
served as opportunities for evangelism.78
Just as under other political leaders, Soviet evangelicals struggled to adapt and express
their faith under Khrushchev. This balancing act was often difficult and divisive, as is especially
evident in the rise of the Initsiativniki, one of the starkest examples of how state pressure can
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affect believers. The Initsiativniki (or “initiatives”) movement began in 1960-1961, as a result of
state pressure put on the existing evangelical church structure. During this time, the All-Union
Council of Evangelical Baptist Churches (AUCECB) revised their church statutes to bring them
“into line with the 1929 legislation on religion.”79 They sent these revisions to the senior
presbyters of the council, along with a “Letter of Instruction.”80 These two documents soon
became the heart of a conflict that would eventually lead to a split in the union and the creation
of a separate union led by the Initsiativniki.81
What was it in these documents that made them so divisive? The letter spoke against
“unhealthy missionary tendencies,” forbade the baptism of children under eighteen years old, and
forbade church members from attending services outside of their own communities.82 Such
phrases and commands understandably provoked many church members, but the AUCECB was
not merely acting out of callousness or disdain towards long-held evangelical beliefs. Sawatsky
points out that “AUCECB officials eventually admitted that they had been forced to issue the
new statute.”83 Placed in a difficult position between church and state, the leaders of the
AUCECB were forced to make a very hard decision.
Their decision, in turn, sparked the Initsiativniki to break away from the union. However,
the protest movement did not begin with a new union; it began with a letter. Responding to the
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church statute revisions and the “Letter of Instruction” sent out by the AUCECB, several
members drafted and sent a response letter.84 Not content with merely stating their dissatisfaction
to the church leaders, they sent a letter to all of the evangelical churches, encouraging them to
seek sanctification, as well as calling for a national congress of believers.85 The following year,
the Initsiativniki began moving towards the creation of a separate union by establishing an
organizing committee (Orgkomitet) for that purpose.86
Khrushchev’s Treatment of Other Dissident Groups
Before discussing any idea, it is important to first define that idea in order to escape any
confusion or broadness in exploring the topic. The same is true of the term “dissident,” which
can carry a variety of meanings. The online Cambridge Dictionary defines a dissident as “a
person who publicly disagrees with and criticizes his or her government.”87 Robert Hornsby uses
a similar definition and states that “a dissenter ‘…does more than simply disagree and think
differently; he openly proclaims his dissent and demonstrates it in one way or another to his
compatriots and his state.’”88 Both of these definitions, when combined, provide the basic
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definition that will be used in this paper to define a Soviet dissident as someone who not only
disagreed with the Soviet government but took steps to express this disagreement, whether
through sabotage, samizdat, or violent protests.
General History of Dissent in Russia
Although there have always been those who resisted the Russian government, this work
will focus on the intelligentsia as one of the earliest forms of dissent in Russia. Shatz argues that
“the present-day Soviet dissidents are in many ways the intelligentsia’s spiritual heirs.”89 Indeed,
Bergman describes how many modern Soviet dissidents looked back to the intelligentsia for
inspiration and comfort.90 Who were the intelligentsia? Shatz defines them as “the educated
critics of the Russian political and social order,” originating due to the westernization measures
of Peter the Great.91
Dissent is an anomaly in a communist state, and the Soviet Union is no different. Powell
states matter-of-factly, “The Soviet government has, of course, always been intolerant of
dissent.”92 This intolerance has expressed itself both in legislation and in outright brutality in
various forms and to varying degrees of intensity from the beginning of the Soviet Union to
modern Russia. For example, Powell cites a 1917 decree which “authorized the closing down of
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opposition newspapers as an ‘emergency measure’.”93 The following year brought the Soviet
constitution, along with further restrictions on “freedom of speech, association and assembly to
those who did not support the new order.”94
At the same time that the new Soviet government was refusing dissent outside of the
Communist Party, it was allowing it within the Communist party. Schapiro points out that
although Lenin harshly resisted any opposition from other political parties, he allowed freedom
of dissent within his own party, with party members allowed to criticize each other and even
their leaders.95 This is an interesting contradiction in the early history of the Soviet Union.
However, it was not to last. Schapiro marks the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921 as the
beginning of a ban on dissent.96 This ban apparently arose due to leaders’ perceptions of the
conflict within the party itself.97
Under Stalin, dissent of any kind was harshly condemned and many were imprisoned and
executed under the “Great Purge.” However, in examining the “Great Purge,” caution should be
taken in attempting to view it as merely a removal of dissident elements from the Soviet
population. Sarah Davies wisely cautions historians against viewing every “dissonant view”
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expressed during the Stalinist period as an example of “unequivocal opposition.”98 She points out
that such a viewpoint merely places historians in the same category as the Soviet government,
which would as easily condemn a man for an anti-Soviet joke as for true anti-Soviet behavior.99
Treatment of Dissidents under Khrushchev
Hornsby argues that the dissent of the Khrushchev era should be viewed as more than
simply a prelude to later dissident groups under Leonid Brezhnev.100 The dissident events of the
Khrushchev era contain “too many significant points of distinction for us to regard Khrushchevera dissent as simply an embryonic form of the subsequent human-rights movement.”101 These
movements were especially distinct in the diversity which they expressed, “both in the social
origins of protesters and the behaviours they engaged in.”102
A record of a conversation between two government officials in 1953 highlights the
diversity of Khrushchev-era dissident actions. The General Consul of the USSR in Cluj
explained in a conversation with the First Secretary of the Regional Party Committee of the
Romanian Work Party a variety of “anti-Soviet actions.”103 Interestingly, the perpetrators of
these activities came from a variety of backgrounds, ranging from Catholics and Pentecostals to
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a professor and a “worker of a forest farm.”104 Their actions also expressed a variety of protest
methods, from calls for pacifism to a refusal to wear red clothes anymore, “because Stalin’s time
had passed, and it would be over with Communism very soon.”105 Finally, these dissidents were
diverse in their reasons for protesting the existing government. In addition to reporting on
religious dissidents, such as Catholics and Pentecostals, the First Secretary also included a list of
three “nationalist groups” at a university in the area.106
Indeed, nationalist movements played a large role in the dissent of this era. Ludmilla
Alekseeva states that “national and religious” dissident movements were “the most widespread
and active.”107 Indeed, she identifies the first protest movement as being nationalistic in nature,
specifically focusing on the movement in the 1950s spurred by the Crimean Tartars who had
been removed from Crimea and were seeking to return there.108 Similar nationalistic movement
arose in Ukraine in the 1960s, with the goals of resisting “the Russification of the republic” and
insisting on “equal rights and democratization for the Ukraine.”109
However, the fact that these people resisted the Soviet government did not mean that they
disagreed with the essential ideology behind the Soviet system. Alekseeva is quick to point out
that many of these early “dissidents” were still essentially Marxists in nature: “Although they
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rebelled against the existing system in spirit, they continued, nevertheless, to evaluate it in
Marxist terms, to analyze it using Marxist methods, and to search for ways to change it within
the framework of a Marxist system.”110 Similarly, Hornsby points out that protests were often
sparked by specific people or incidents, not by the Soviet system itself.111 However, this Marxist
idealism was soon to change. Hornsby identifies a shift in dissident perspectives from the 1950s
to the early 1960s, arguing that earlier dissidents tended to be more idealistic, while later ones
“advocated major political change and even violent resistance.”112
The Khrushchev period saw a growth in the use of self-publication, or samizdat, as a vital
tool of dissent. This tool has already been mentioned in connection with the Initsiativniki, but its
role in other dissident movements was also important. Samizdat was, essentially, a form of selfpublication that allowed dissidents to spread their ideas freely without government control
through a system of diffusion, wherein each person created a copy of the original document and
passed the copy on to others.113 Although poetry served as the initial impetus for samizdat in
Russia, samizdat soon expanded to include “essays, short stories, and articles.”114 The journal
Syntax, published in 1960, is “often considered the first samizdat journal.”115
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How did Khrushchev respond to these examples of dissent? Just as in other policy areas,
Khrushchev’s response to dissent employed both a continuation with the goals of the past and
new methods. Indeed, it is Khrushchev’s deviation from the past that has earned him a place in
the memory of the American people. Khrushchev’s loosening of regulations came to be known
as a cultural “thaw,” allowing a certain degree of freedom for Soviet artists and writers. Indeed,
he personally supported the publication of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan
Denisovich.116 Speaking to the mechanics of this transition, Sakwa states, “Under Khrushchev
the secret police apparatus was partially dismantled and the relaxation allowed the thaw to
begin.”117 Interestingly, Sakwa argues that Khrushchev even supported cultural opposition to the
extent that it criticized the Stalinist regime and helped “strengthen his position against the
conservatives.”118 Perhaps Khrushchev hoped that by allowing a degree of freedom, he would be
able to distance himself from the Stalinist past, gaining a positive reputation not only in the eyes
of his own people but in the eyes of the West as well.
However, this “thaw” could be easily misinterpreted and broken for Khrushchev’s own
benefit. Indeed, Hornsby argues that the perception of the 1950s and the 1960s as a time of
“thaw” is misleading, distracting from the thousands of dissidents jailed for their views.119 Over
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the course of Khrushchev’s time in office, the authorities gradually refined their methods of
repression.120 For example, Hornsby argues that during the 1950s, government response to
dissidents was often marked by what he calls a “‘firefighting’ approach.”121 Indeed, the imagery
of a firefighter, hastily trying to put out random flames as they burst out of the ground, could
help explain some of the randomness which is sometimes present when examining Soviet
actions. However, this approach was gradually replaced by “a more sophisticated and less
outwardly repressive approach” by the late 1950s.122 Soviet response to dissidents may have
varied from the Stalinist period in form and, to some extent, in intensity, but the goals remained
the same.123
Khrushchev’s “secret speech” denouncing Stalin serves as the first key moment in the
story of his interaction with dissent. Indeed, multiple scholars agree that it was Khrushchev’s
denunciation of Stalin that paved the way for greater freedom, allowing dissidents to feel that
perhaps their words would not be as harshly judged as before. For example, Alekseeva states
that, although there were examples of religious and nationalistic dissent in the pre-revolutionary
period, these movements truly began after Stalin’s death in 1953 and especially after the “secret
speech.”124 Similarly, Hornsby maintains that Khrushchev’s “secret speech” was the starting
point for dissent among the intelligentsia, who saw in the speech a denunciation of “rule by
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terror” and “an assurance that there would be no return to full-blooded Stalinism.”125 However,
he interestingly points out that the effect of the “secret speech” on dissent can be overestimated,
as the “secret speech” most directly influenced the intelligentsia rather than “other sections of the
population.”126 Whether the impact of the “secret speech” was large or small, it is certain that the
speech did have an impact on the actions of dissidents.
If the period following the “secret speech” was marked by a lightening of restrictions on
dissidents, the period following the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was likewise marked by an
increased attack on freedom of expression. Khrushchev feared that the protests in Hungary
would spark similar protests in other Eastern European countries and perhaps even in Russia.127
This could not be allowed. On December 19, 1956, a secret letter was sent throughout the
Communist Party with the purpose of suppressing “attacks by anti-Soviet enemy elements.”128
Hornsby argues that it was the Hungarian Revolution that provided the “immediate impetus” for
Khrushchev’s sudden suppression of dissent at this time.129
The Soviet government used a variety of methods to discourage dissent, ranging from
media attacks to imprisonment. Government-directed journals and newspapers would
occasionally release stinging condemnations of certain actions or people with the goal of
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intimidating them into silence.130 For example, a Washington Post article from 1962 reports on
the public disgracing of certain young poets in the publication Komsomolskaya Pravda.131
Co-workers, friends, and even KGB agents would join the cry against dissent, pressuring
dissidents into silence. According to Hornsby, “Members of any given collective were
increasingly expected to take an active interest in the ideological lives of their fellow
members…”132 And, of course, “taking an interest” could take a variety of forms. If the pressure
of co-workers and friends was not enough, the pressure of a “prophylactic chat” might be
applied. A key component of the “prophylaxis” highlighted by Khrushchev in his speech at the
21st Congress, the “prophylactic chat” was essentially an uncomfortable conversation between an
individual and a KGB agent, meant to dissuade the individual from dissident conversation and
behavior.133 During these “chats,” the agent “questioned his targets, manipulated or intimidated
them into confession, and warned that if they committed another crime, they would be severely
punished.”134
If a dissident resisted even the “friendly” influences of those around him, he could be
sentenced to imprisonment, or worse. In spite of de-Stalinization, the Khrushchev period saw a
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record number of arrests when compared to the rest of the “post-Secret Speech era.”135 However,
imprisonment was not the worst that could happen to a dissident. The 1950s and 1960s provide
evidence of dissidents being confined to psychiatric wards, a fate which most dissidents viewed
as worse than imprisonment, as their sentences could be of indefinite length.136 Added to the
frustration, they could often be denied the right to represent themselves in court.137
However, Khrushchev’s own government soon reversed the anti-dissident campaign. In
1958, the Supreme Court presented a report in which they argued that the campaign had been
poorly handled.138 It had mis-labeled and over-sentenced Soviet citizens who “should not have
been branded ‘anti-Soviet’.”139 Of course, this presented a problem: How were officials to
correctly identify ‘anti-Soviet’ behavior without a clear definition of what that meant? The
Supreme Court soon followed their report by a resolution defining what ‘anti-Soviet’ behavior
truly was, as well as a subsequent “Law on State Crimes.”140
This subsequent “legalization” of the anti-dissident process was not to be the last change
to face dissidents as they grappled to survive. In July 1962, a report was issued reviewing the
government’s progress against dissent.141 It argued that, although progress had been made,
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additional steps were necessary.142 A newspaper article from 1963 reports on a speech by
Khrushchev, in which he demanded “absolute adherence to the party line in ideological
questions. No more deviations from Socialist realism will be tolerated in literature and the
performing and fine arts.”143 This new attack on dissidents spoke to the lie of the Khrushchev
“thaw.”
Comparison
Both evangelicals and other dissidents paid a price for their determination to express their
beliefs, but did Khrushchev respond to these two groups in the same way? Overall, the Soviet
government during the Khrushchev period tended to adopt a differentiated approach in
addressing dissident behavior. Hornsby suggests that the government could treat dissidents
differently, based on the source of their complaints and how easily these complaints could be
addressed.144 For example, dissent and protests on the parts of workers generally grew out of
“material discontent”; the government responded to this discontent by bettering living
conditions.145 By contrast, the dissent of the intelligentsia focused on political disagreements
which could not as easily be resolved: “As such, their grievances were mostly ignored or
suppressed...”146 Moreover, Hornsby states that the Soviet government, “implicitly differentiated
between religious, nationalist and political dissent, hardly ever clamping down on more than one
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of the three at any given time and often employing distinct methods to deal with each of
them.”147
In summary, the timing and methods used by the Khrushchev government against
evangelicals and other dissidents differed from each other.148 The anti-religious campaign of
1959-1964 is steadier both in its intensity and its length than comparable examples of antidissident campaigns during the same period. For example, although there were variations in
methods and, to some extent, in intensity, the anti-religious campaign continued unabated for the
period of 1959-1964. By contrast, the anti-dissident campaigns of the Khrushchev era seem to be
marked by a greater sense of ebb and flow. These variations could very likely stem from the
natures of religious and non-religious dissent. For example, Hornsby argues that “many acts of
protest resulted from anger at very specific events or individuals rather than rejection of the
Soviet system as a whole.”149 Especially during the early ‘firefighting’ days of anti-dissident
propaganda, the random nature of dissent would most likely result in a relatively random
response to it.
Similarly, both the anti-religious and the anti-dissident campaigns contained elements
apparently unique to both. For example, during the anti-religious campaigns, there were several
rumors of parental rights being withdrawn from evangelical parents.150 If the same method was
used against dissidents, it did not provoke enough of a response to be mentioned in scholarly
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works. Similarly, while confinement to psychiatric wards was a method used against nonreligious dissidents, this method does not appear to have been mentioned in scholarly works
describing the treatment of evangelicals.
However, historians should express caution in whole-heartedly accepting Hornsby’s
argument, as the anti-religious and anti-dissident campaigns do contain a great deal of
similarities, especially in the methods used. For example, both campaigns employed media
attacks, public humiliation, and imprisonment as persuasive tactics to silence dissent. Moreover,
both campaigns expressed a certain degree of differentiation in how they treated subcategories of
dissidents, such as the government’s differentiated treatment of registered and unregistered
congregations in the early 1960s.
Conclusion
This comparison of Khrushchev’s treatment of evangelicals and other dissidents
highlights that the idea of the Khrushchev “thaw” can be misleading, as it does not account for
the complexities of this period of Soviet history. Khrushchev displayed a significant amount of
inconsistency in his behaviors towards different dissident groups. The 1950s-1960s were a time
of both thaw and hardening, freedom and persecution, often in varying degrees at varying times
to varying groups. His policies towards dissidents often vacillated, influenced by world events,
popular opinion, and political agendas, especially in the case of intellectual dissidents.
Moreover, implying that the entire period was a time of “thaw” risks missing not only the
complexities of this era but also the stories of those living under it. Historians may choose to
focus on Alexander Solzhenitsyn, allowed to release his bold critique of the Stalinist era, and
ignore those dissidents who suffered due to their critique of the Khrushchev era or those
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evangelicals who had been suffering, with little respite, from the very beginning of the Soviet
Union. A more balanced view of the “thaw” will hopefully encourage historians to discover and
share these new stories of lesser-known dissidents.
Finally, by simplifying the story of an entire decade into one word, historians risk
engaging in poor scholarship. History is often messy, and a simple explanation can be very
tempting. When an entire period is simplified into one word, this temptation becomes even
stronger. Historians may inadvertently ignore certain facts because they do not fit into the
narrative of a “thaw” and complicate the story being told. However, these facts are still a part of
the Soviet story and should be highlighted.
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